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I. The Court of Appeals should dismiss the State's appeal 
because the order appealed from is an acquittal, which 
is not appealable under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(2). 
In the alternative, the Court should dismiss the appeal 
because the State has not complied with the procedural 
requirements of the statute. 
II. Absent dismissal, the Court of Appeals should affirm the 
trial court's suppression order. There was no transition 
from detention to voluntary encounter. Rather, Deputy 
Slaugh detained Mogen illegally. Slaugh had no 
reasonable suspicion to search the truck that Mogen was 
driving. Mogen's consent to search was not valid. 
Conclusion 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
DEAN ALLEN MOGEN, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Appellate Case No. 20010207-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
Appellee Dean Allen Mogen contests the State's statement of jurisdiction. As he 
argues below, the State has no statutory right to appeal this case. 
Statement of Issue Presented for Review, 
With Standard of Review 
Assuming that the State possesses a right to appeal, the single issue presented for 
review and the standard of review governing it are: 
Issue. Did the trial court err in granting Mogen's motion to suppress, on grounds 
that Mogen's detention exceeded the scope of the original traffic stop, Mogen was not 
free to terminate the encounter with police and leave the scene, and police lacked 
reasonable suspicion to engage in investigative questioning that led to search of his 
vehicle? 
Standard of review. In search and seizure cases, the trial court's conclusions of 
law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^  7, 17 P.3d 
1135, cert, granted, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001). The trial court's findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)). 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, 
Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2) (1999). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(2) (1999). 
Statutes are reproduced in full in the Addendum. 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case 
A deputy sheriff stopped Mogen for speeding and issued a verbal warning. The 
deputy also searched Mogen's vehicle, though there was no reason to do so, after 
receiving consent. He found 1.8 grams of methamphetamine and a small torch. Mogen 
was arrested and charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), and one count 
of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
2 
Ann. § 58-37a-5( 1)(1981) 
Course' of Proceedings 
The trial court held a preliminary hearing, after which it bound over Mogen on 
both counts. Mogen denied the charges and subsequently filed a motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine and torch. 
C. Disposition a; i ruhv, ^ ; 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the evidence in question 
should be suppressed as a matter of law. Afterwards, upon motion by the State, the 
court entered an "order to disi i: liss," disn lissii lg w it! l pi eji idice tl le case agaii ist 1\ logei i 
Relevant Facts 
Shortly after midnight, on August 22, 2000, Uintah County Deputy Troy Slaugh1 
was driving his marked patrol vehicle on an isolated stretch of Highway 40 near Jensen, 
Utah. A large flatbed truck approacl led 1 lii i I at ahigl u ate of speed 1 rom the opposite 
direction Slaw ti u ned oi 11 lis radar and determined that the truck was traveling 69 miles 
per hour in an area where the speed limit had become 50. After they passed, Slaugh 
made a U-turn, activated his overhead emergency lights, and pulled the truck over and 
made contact »ulli M<>L',em (In; di IWI Moyni \MIS alum: in Ilk1 vohirk\ U "'. "n\"\ r'" I,"-
13,71.2.71.5-6,71.10. 
'Officer Slaugh's name was misspelled in the transcripts of the preliminary hearing 
and suppression hearing, and it is misspelled also in the brief of appellant. 
3 
The truck was owned by Malcolm's Rat Hole, an oil field company, where Mogen 
worked as a supervisor. R. 72.10-11, 72.20, 71.11-12. The truck had large flared sides. 
R. 71.14. Also, at that time, it was transporting a cell ring. Id. Mogen was one of a 
number of company employees who had access to the truck. R. 72.10-11, 72.23. A 
locked briefcase in the truck belonged to another employee. R. 72.9-10, 72.26. 
Slaugh approached Mogen, seated behind the wheel, and asked for his driver's 
license. He then contacted dispatch, which ran routine driver's license and warrants 
checks. Mogen, it turned out, possessed a valid driver's license and he had no 
outstanding warrants. R. 72.14-15, 71.3. This took some five to ten minutes. R. 72.15, 
71.12. During this time, Mogen busied himself by taking out log books in the truck and 
filling them out. R. 71.12. 
Slaugh returned Mogen's driver's license to him and issued a verbal warning for 
speeding. R. 72.4, 72.17, 71.3. What happened next is disputed. Slaugh claimed that 
he told Mogen that he was free to leave. R. 72.4, 71.3. But Mogen testified that he did 
not recall being told that he could leave, and more to the point, he never heard Slaugh 
tell him that. R. 71.13, 71.16. Mogen also testified that Slaugh acted in an unusual 
manner after returning his license. Slaugh stared at Mogen "a few seconds," which he 
interpreted to mean, "I felt that he [Slaugh] had something more to say." R. 71.14. 
It is undisputed that Slaugh turned and took "a couple of steps" toward his patrol 
vehicle but then turned back and made contact again with Mogen. R. 72.4, 71.4, 71.8. 
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A matter of seconds had passed, "definitely less than ten seconds" by Slaugh's account, 
driven away. He did not do so, he testified, because of officer safety. He was concerned 
about hitting Slaugh with the flared side of his truck or the cell ring that he was 
ti anspoi tii ig R 71 1 1 \ lso, 1 le stated that he believed that he was not free to go. I he 
overhead emergency lights oi I Slaugl i's pati c >1 \ ; irel lick • ^ ^  ' ere still oi I ai id flasl lii ig L / Bi it 
more than that, "even when [Slaugh had] stepped back, but when he took a step back, he 
just, he acted like he still had something he wanted to say to me. ...I could just feel it 
diiii idl |ii:>l In Ins iatiiti expressions." i\ 
Slaugh did have something llv.il * • •»* • > s:i\ I h: asked Moiien "if hi 'il mind 
if! took a look in his vehicle for any illegal drugs, guns, knives or bombs." R. 72.4, 71.4. 
There was, Slaugh testified, "no particular reason" for the request. R. 71 A No 
* ••'«; :-' -..K.:V a- ;i: p-ain viev •. fogen aereeo .- he search K '2.4, 
/ i .4 , 71.15. Slaugh • • "t Hi*, Murk :ipJ • 1I"MI I' hi'-' he concluded 
a search. R. 72.4-5, 72.18-19. This search revealed a quantity of methamphetamine in 
an Advil bottle in the ashtray, as well as a small torch under the front passenger seat of 
tl le tit i ic 1 ;: R 72 5 6, 72 8 I"\ logei i subsequently was arrested and charged with 
possession of a controlled substance ai id possessioi i of cli i igparaphen lalia 
Summary of the Argument 
The Court of Appeals should dismiss the State's appeal because the order 
5 
appealed from is an acquittal, which is not appealable under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-
1(2). In the alternative, the Court should dismiss the appeal because the State has not 
complied with the procedural requirements of the statute. 
Absent dismissal, the Court should affirm the trial court's suppression order. 
There was no transition from detention to voluntary encounter. Rather, Deputy Slaugh 
detained Mogen illegally. Slaugh had no reasonable suspicion to search the truck that 
Mogen was driving. Mogen's consent to search was not valid. 
Argument 
I. The Court of Appeals should dismiss the 
State's appeal because the order appealed 
from is an acquittal, which is not appealable 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2). In 
the alternative, the Court should dismiss 
the appeal because the State has not complied 
with the procedural requirements of the 
statute. 
At the outset it is necessary to determine precisely what the matter is that the 
State, as appellant, is attempting to obtain review of in this case. The State's initial brief 
is not clear. The State avers in its opening sentence, 'This is an appeal from an order 
dismissing" the two misdemeanor drug charges filed against Mogen in district court. Br. 
Appellant 1. The State then asserts, in its jurisdictional statement, that this Court may 
review the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) ("The Court of 
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction ... over: interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first degree (?r capital 
6 
felony [.]"). Id. The State finally claims, in its statement of the single issue to be 
reviewed, as well as its summary of argument, that the trial court erred in granting 
Mogen's motion to suppress the evidence found in the company truck that he was 
driving. Id. at 1-2, 4-5. Therefore, we are confronted with three possibilities as to what 
the State wishes to appeal. They are: (1) the final judgment of dismissal of the trial 
court, (2) the suppression order of the trial court, viewed as an interlocutory decision, 
and (3) the suppression order of the trial court, considered independently of the final 
judgment of dismissal. 
The second possibility may be easily eliminated. Review of the record indicates 
that the trial court's suppression order was not an interlocutory decision. R. 56-59. The 
fact that the trial court entered an "order to dismiss" the action against Mogen provides 
additional evidence for this interpretation. R. 60-62. Further, the State has made no 
filings under Utah R. App. P. 5, providing for discretionary appeals from interlocutory 
orders. Consequently, it is apparent that the State is seeking appellate review of one of 
only two things, either the trial court's final judgment of dismissal or the earlier order of 
suppression. 
Clarification is essential. The State's right to appeal in criminal cases is not 
absolute. Indeed, the State has no right to appeal except as expressly provided by 
statute. State v. Kalbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977). Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-
1(2) (1999) sets forth specific judgments and orders from which the State may appeal. 
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The section states in relevant part: "An appeal may be taken from the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a 
refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; ...(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence when upon petition for review the appellate court decides 
that the appeal would be in the interest of justice[.]" If a judgment or order is not of the 
type included in the section, it may not be appealed by the State. "[S]ection 77-18a-1(2) 
is restrictive rather than permissive and, thus, the State has no right to appeal except as 
expressly provided therein." State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 920 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (citations omitted). 
In this context, Mogen contends first that the "order dismissing" the two counts 
against him constituted an acquittal, not a final judgment of dismissal. An acquittal is 
not appealable by the State. 
State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1991), is in point. Factually, the case is very similar to this case. Police stopped 
Willard at a roadblock to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations. Willard 
provided officers with valid documents. Subsequently, he consented to search of his 
vehicle, during which the officers found a controlled substance. Willard moved to 
suppress the evidence. The trial court granted the motion, on grounds that Willard's 
continued detention was unconstitutional once the purpose for the roadblock had been 
accomplished and his consent to search therefore was irrelevant. Then the trial court 
8 
entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The State appealed. Id. at 190-91. 
In Willard, as here, the State specifically sought review of the trial court's 
suppression order, arguing that the analysis underlying the order was erroneous. The 
Court of Appeals did not consider the State's argument. Rather, the Court dismissed the 
appeal, because the trial court acquitted Willard even though it terminated the case by 
means of what was labeled as a dismissal. Id. at 191-92. Granting of a motion to 
suppress, on occasion, may result in acquittal as opposed to dismissal. Acquittal 
definitely lies in drug cases when, without admission of the controlled substance seized, 
the State is unable to make out a necessary element and defendant cannot be convicted 
of the crime charged. In Willard, the Court of Appeals expressed this principle as 
follows: "A ruling that constitutes a factual resolution in favor of the defendant on one 
or more of the elements of the offense charged is an acquittal." Id. at 191 (citing United 
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978) and State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1064 
(Utah 1983)). This principle also finds expression in a well established statute and 
equally well established case law in this jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2) 
(1999) ("There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in ... a determination that there 
was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction."). See also State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d 
267, 268-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (so-called dismissal based on insufficient evidence is 
actually acquittal, which State cannot appeal); State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586, 588-89 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (acquittal resulting from insufficient evidence is not appealable). 
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There are two reasons why the State may not appeal an acquittal. Section 77- 18a-
1(2) does not authorize the State to appeal such cases. Jackson, 857 P.2d at 268-69. 
More basically, however, to permit the State to appeal an acquittal would violate the rule 
against double jeopardy. Scott, 437 U.S. at 95-97; Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1065; 
Jackson, 857 P.2d at 269; Willard, 801 P.2d at 191. This is so even though a trial court 
improperly determined the facts or incorrectly applied the law when acquitting a 
defendant. Willard, 801 P.2d at 191 (citing Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1065). 
In this case, the trial court acquitted Mogen when it suppressed evidence and 
entered an order of dismissal. It is irrelevant that the case was terminated by what was 
called a dismissal. The label attached to a ruling is not determinative of what it is in fact 
and whether it is appealable under section 77-18a-1(2). Larsen, 834 P.2d at 589 (citing 
State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), affd, 852 P.2d 981 
(Utah 1993)). Here, the final judgment of dismissal was an acquittal. The earlier 
suppression order had the effect of totally gutting the State's case against Mogen. 
Because the methamphetamine and torch found in the truck were now inadmissible as 
evidence, the State could not prove that Mogen actually possessed a controlled 
substance or drug paraphernalia. It could not, in other words, make out necessary 
elements in either of the two statutes that Mogen was accused of violating, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37a-5(l). The prosecutor in the case admitted as much 
when he stated in his motion to dismiss: 
10 
2. [T]he Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, concluding that the officer did not have a legal 
basis to perform a search, thereby suppressing the 
evidence. 
3. Without the evidence, the State cannot proceed with 
the case. 
R. 62. The methamphetamine and torch were the sine qua non of the State's case. 
Without them, the State had no case. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should reach the same result that it did in 
Willard. There the Court held, "Without the admission of the controlled substance 
seized in the search of Willard's truck, there could be no conviction of the crime 
charged, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. [AJlthough 
labeled a dismissal, the order appealed from is an acquittal and not a 'dismissal'.... The 
[State's] appeal is therefore dismissed." Willard, 801 P.2d at 192. Here, the State's 
appeal also should be dismissed. The State is attempting to appeal from what clearly is 
an acquittal under section 76-1-403(2) and extant case law in this jurisdiction. Section 
77-18a-1(2) does not authorize such appeals. Further, the rule against double jeopardy 
shields Mogen against further State action on the same charges. 
In the alternative, Mogen contends that the State's appeal should be dismissed 
because the State has failed to comply with the procedural requirements of section 77-
18a-1(2). This assumes, for purposes of argument, that the trial court's final judgment of 
dismissal does not constitute an acquittal. 
11 
State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223 (Utah 1985), began the process of imposing 
certain procedural requirements upon the State in cases where it seeks to appeal adverse 
suppression orders at the trial court level. In Waddoups, as in this case, the trial court 
suppressed key evidence, the State decided that it could not proceed against defendant, 
and then as a matter of strategy it requested and received an order of dismissal that it 
immediately appealed. The Supreme Court held that the State's appeal was improper 
and dismissed it in a brief, unanimous decision. At issue was language in Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(c), now repealed, as opposed to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(c)(5), now repealed 
as well.2 Rule 26 permitted an appeal of right by the prosecution from a "final judgment 
of dismissal." On the other hand, section 77-35-26 did not permit an appeal from an 
order granting a pretrial motion to suppress as a matter of right but only "when, upon a 
petition for review, the supreme court decides that such an appeal would be in the 
interest of justice." Faced with this conflict, the court opined that "The State has 
attempted to circumvent this Court's discretion to grant or deny petitions for review ... by 
requesting a dismissal and relying on ... Rule 26(c)...." It also stated its rationale for 
dismissing the State's appeal: "It is clear ... that the State wishes to have this Court 
review, not the trial court's order of dismissal, but the earlier order of suppression. To 
allow an appeal of right in such a circumstance would give the State an appeal of right 
2As is apparent, section 77-18a-1(2) contains language that is identical to what 
previously was contained in rule 26 and section 77-35-26. 
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from virtually every adverse pretrial order. That result would be inconsistent with our 
law and would be a distortion of the language and intent of [section 77-35-26]." Id. at 
224. 
Eight years later, in State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993), defendant 
attempted to rely on Walloups in arguing that the State's appeal should be dismissed. 
There, as here, the trial court suppressed evidence, the State determined that it could not 
prosecute defendant, and so the court upon motion ordered that the case be dismissed. 
The State appealed, seeking review of the court's ruling that the evidence was not 
admissible. The Supreme Court, this time, refused to dismiss the appeal. It specifically 
interpreted section 77-18a-l(2)(a) to mean that the State possessed "an appeal of right 
from a final judgment of dismissal without any limitation whatsoever. It is wholly 
unwarranted to conclude that the prosecution may not raise on appeal the validity of the 
suppression order which led to the dismissal." Troyer, 866 P.2d at 530. The court also 
hastened to add, however, that "The concerns we expressed in Waddoups about potential 
manipulation of the right to appeal are still valid." Id. at 531. For that reason, two 
conditions were imposed upon the State, both of which must be satisfied whenever the 
State wishes appellate review of suppression orders. 
First, we will review suppression orders as a matter of right 
only if they substantially impair the prosecution from 
proceedings with a case. ...We will therefore review 
suppression orders on appeal from a dismissal only where 
the trial court certifies that the evidence suppressed 
substantially impairs the prosecution's case. 
13 
Second, as a further safeguard, we will require the State 
to request dismissal with prejudice to obtain review of 
suppression orders on an appeal of right from a dismissal 
Id. at 531. 
The State, in this case, met the second requirement. See R. 60 (trial court's 
dismissal with prejudice). But it did not meet the first. The record is devoid of any 
certification, by the trial court, that suppression of the methamphetamine and torch 
"substantially impaired" the prosecution's ability to proceed. The prosecutor's statement 
in his motion to dismiss is not sufficient, even assuming for the sake of argument that it 
says what is required. According to Troyer, certification must come from the trial court 
rather than the prosecutor for reasons of due process. Id. Because the State failed to 
comply with all the requirements of section 77-18a-1(2), as set forth in Troyer, the Court 
of Appeals should dismiss the State's appeal in this case. 
There are, however, additional reasons why this Court should dismiss the State's 
appeal, in light of the analysis contained in Waddoups and Troyer. 
The State has engaged in the very kind of prosecutorial manipulation that the 
Supreme Court criticized so sharply in Waddoups. The State obtained a final judgment 
of dismissal from the trial court and now seeks appellate review pursuant to section 77-
18a-l(2)(a), even though there is every indication that what it really desires to appeal is 
not the dismissal order but rather the suppression order. Arguably, a better course of 
action for the State to have followed was to appeal the suppression order, as an 
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interlocutory decision, pursuant to section 77-18a-l(2)(e). But the State neglected to do 
so in a timely manner. Also, of course, the State avoided the necessity of convincing this 
Court that its appeal should be granted "in the interest of justice." Such inaction should 
not be condoned. 
Troyer supports the view that the State preferably should have filed a petition for 
interlocutory appeal in this case. The Supreme Court noted that in enacting section 77-
18a-l the legislature "recognized the utility" of such appeals. Troyer, 866 P.2d at 530. 
Indeed, "[t]here are ... instances when the granting of an interlocutory appeal will save 
trial time and expense by having certain issues settled and decided by an appellate court 
during the course of the trial proceedings." Id. The Supreme Court also observed that 
even if the State files a petition, and it is denied, the State's appeal of right at the 
conclusion of the case is not affected. Id. For these reasons, the State had nothing to 
lose by seeking review of the suppression order as an interlocutory decision, rather than 
manipulating the system as it has done. 
In not pursuing an interlocutory appeal, the State has sidestepped the process of 
demonstrating that its appeal is "in the interest of justice." Further, by not obtaining trial 
court certification, the State is unable to show that evidence suppressed "substantially 
impaired" the prosecution's ability to proceed. Appellate review of the case therefore is 
impossible and should not be granted. Still, even if review took place under Troyer, this 
Court properly should come to the conclusion that the case is not appealable on grounds 
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that the dismissal of the trial court constituted an acquittal. To come full circle, Willard 
trumps Troyer. Or more properly speaking, Willard trumps Troyer in the unique facts 
and circumstances of this case. 
Certainly one of the most interesting aspects of Troyer is that it did not refer in 
any way to Willard, decided three years earlier. Troyer is of course a Supreme Court 
case, whereas Willardwas decided by the Court of Appeals. Troyer would seem to be 
controlling. If so, there was no need to recognize an inferior court. The holding in 
Willard, however, is based squarely on rulings of the United States Supreme Court. 
Scott, 437 U.S. at 96-97 (a ruling that constitutes a factual resolution in favor of the 
defendant on one or more of the elements of the offense charged is an acquittal; a 
defendant once acquitted may not be again subjected to trial without violating the double 
jeopardy clause); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) (the double jeopardy clause 
bars the prosecution from bringing a second action against a defendant when it failed to 
muster sufficient evidence to convict him or her in the first action); see also Smalis v. 
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144-45 (1986) (a judgment by the trial court that the 
evidence is insufficient to convict constitutes an acquittal.) The holding also is based on 
a decision of the Utah Supreme Court. Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1064 (a ruling that 
constitutes a factual resolution in favor of the defendant on one or more of the elements 
of the offense charged is an acquittal). Thus, Troyer most definitely can and should be 
scrutinized using Willard. 
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At first blush, Troyer and Willard conflict with one another. Troyer allows the 
State to obtain appellate review of adverse suppression orders where such orders 
"substantially impair" the prosecution's case. On the other hand, Willard bars appeals 
by the State seeking review of suppression orders that have the effect of making it 
impossible for the prosecution to proceed against a defendant, specifically because the 
particular evidence suppressed is needed to prove an element of the crime charged. The 
question that naturally arises is this: Doesn't "substantial impairment" include, as an 
obvious example, "inability to proceed" due to insufficiency of admissible evidence 
following a suppression hearing? 
The answer is no. Troyer and Willard can be harmonized, and in fact they do not 
conflict at all. Troyer speaks of "substantial impairment." Such phrasing implies 
situations where the State can still prosecute a case, even after an adverse suppression 
order, because there is other admissible evidence indicative of guilt. Whether the 
evidence would sustain a conviction is irrelevant; the point is, other admissible evidence 
exists. This in fact was the situation in Troyer, where, incidentally, defendant was 
charged with first degree murder, not garden-variety misdemeanor drug possession. In 
dismissing the case, the trial court stated, "If the state's attorney says that he is not able 
to proceed with this case, and does not feel that he could secure a conviction on the 
remaining evidence, the court has not choice but to dismiss." Troyer, 866 P.2d at 528-
29 (emphasis added). 
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The State, in Troyer, was not faced with the prospect of attempting to prosecute 
defendant when all evidence needed to prove guilt was suppressed. But this did happen 
in Willard. Willard was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute. The trial court suppressed the contraband found in his vehicle. Thus, the 
State could not make out possession, a necessary element of the offense charged. No 
other evidence of any kind remained for the State to pursue an action against Willard. 
The contraband truly was sine qua non. 
For these reasons, Troyer holds that in cases in which only some needed evidence 
is suppressed, the State's case is substantially impaired, and the State cannot proceed 
against defendant in a manner where conviction is likely, appellate review of the 
suppression order of a trial court is possible under section 77-18a-l(2)(e) (interlocutory 
appeal) or 77-18a-1 (2)(a) (appeal from final judgment of dismissal). Willard holds that 
in cases in which all needed evidence is suppressed, the State's case is vitiated and 
rendered unprovable, and the State cannot proceed against defendant in any manner 
whatsoever, appellate review is not possible because the trial court in effect has acquitted 
defendant and acquittals are not appealable under the section. These two holdings are 
completely compatible with one another. 
Applying the law to the facts of this case, it is clear that the trial court's 
suppression order and subsequent dismissal constituted an acquittal of Mogen. The State 
is not entitled to appellate review of the order and dismissal. Accordingly, the State's 
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appeal should be dismissed. 
II. Absent dismissal, the Court of Appeals should 
affirm the trial court's suppression order. There 
was no transition from detention to voluntary 
encounter. Rather, Deputy Slaugh detained Mogen 
illegally. Slaugh had no reasonable suspicion to 
search the truck that Mogen was driving. Mogen's 
consent to search was not valid. 
Assuming that this Court does not dismiss the State's appeal the narrow issue 
presented for review is: Did Slaugh's questioning of Mogen and the request to search the 
truck constitute a continuing detention despite the fact that Slaugh had issued Mogen a 
verbal warning about speeding and returned his driver's license to him? If so, Fourth 
Amendment protections apply. State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). Or, was the encounter between Slaugh and Mogen merely consensual after the 
warning and return of the license? If that is true, no constitutional rights are implicated.3 
Significantly, the State does not argue in its original brief that despite the 
illegality of Mogen's continued detention his consent to search of the truck was in fact 
valid. Cf. State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, fflf 17-25, 17 P.3d 1135, cert, granted, 26 
P.3d 235 (Utah 2001). The State, in other words, has defined the salient issue in the 
case to be whether Mogen was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
when he gave consent, not whether that consent was voluntary and not obtained by 
police exploitation of prior illegality. The State has made this a detention case, not a 
consent case. As a result, a number of cases that the State cites in support of its position, 
e.g. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996), are inapposite. 
Because the State does not argue that Mogen's consent was valid, even though his 
detention at the time of consent was illegal, the State has failed to properly present the 
issue for purposes of appeal and this Court may not consider it. i;It is well established 
that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State 
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998); Utah R. App. P. 240). Also, a reviewing 
court will not address arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief, including 
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Id. 
It is clear that Slaugh had every right to pull Mogen over because he was speeding. 
A police officer is completely justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is "incident to a 
traffic violation committed in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P.2 489, 491 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). It is also clear that, when Slaugh stopped Mogen, Mogen was 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 653 (1979). What is not clear, however, is precisely how long that seizure lasted 
and when, if ever, Slaugh's contact with Mogen became consensual before Mogen finally 
drove off.4 Fortunately, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue that is raised 
here. The court stated, "A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment when, 
considering the totality of the circumstances, the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officer's 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter or go about his or her business." State v. 
claims of plain error. State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), 
cert denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
4For scholarly discussion of the subject of when traffic stops may cease being 
seizures and become consensual encounters, see George M. Dery III, "When Will This 
Traffic Stop End? ": The United States Supreme Court's Dodge of Every Detained 
Motorist's Central Concern-Ohio v. Robinette, 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 519 (1998); 
Aaron H. Mendelsohn, Supreme Court Review, The Fourth Amendment and Traffic 
Stops: Bright-Line Rules in Conjunction with the Totality of the Circumstances Test, 
88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 930 (1998); Ian D. Midgley, Comment, Just One Question 
Before We Get to Ohio v. Robinette: "Are You Carrying Any Contraband... Weapons, 
Drugs, Constitutional Protections ... Anything Like That?, " 48 Case W. Res. 173 
(1997); see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3(a) (3d ed. 1996). 
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Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 466 
U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983); United States v. 
Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994); State v. Ramirez, ill P.2d 774, 786 
(Utah 1991)). It further stated, "Once a person is seized for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, the seizure does not cease simply because the police formulate an 
uncommunicated intention that the seized person may go his or her way. For the seizure 
to end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from the words of an officer or from 
the clear import of the circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go about his or her 
business." Id. (citing Sandoval, 29 F.3d at 540-41). 
Here, then, the pertinent question is whether Mogen, as a reasonable person, in 
light of all the circumstances at the time, was free to immediately drive off after Slaugh 
issued the verbal warning and returned his driver's license, plus refuse Slaugh's virtually 
contemporaneous request to search the truck. Mogen concedes that the trial court's 
comments, when it granted the motion to suppress, might have been more ample and 
specific. The court's written findings of fact likewise might have been more detailed, 
though, it must be noted, it was the prosecutor not defense counsel who both asked for 
and prepared these findings.5 R. 47-48, 56-59. Nonetheless, this Court can and should 
5In this regard, the State may not obtain appellate review of the case because of 
any claimed insufficiency of the trial court's written findings of fact. The State was the 
cause of such putative error below. "[W]e will not permit a party to claim error at the 
trial level when the part}* asserting the error led the trial court to commit it." State v. 
Chapoose, 1999 UT 83. «[ 7, 985 P.2d 915. Indeed, as the State made a conscious 
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review the record as it has been offered up, in particular the transcripts of the preliminary 
hearing and suppression hearing. The "power of review is strictly limited to the record 
presented on appeal." Van Cott v. Wall, 178 P.2d 42, 48 (Utah 1918) (on application 
for rehearing). And here, upon review, the record is more than sufficient to show that the 
trial court was correct in concluding that Mogen was not free to terminate the encounter 
with Slaugh and he was still seized when search of the truck occurred. 
A host of factors supports the determination of the trial court that Mogen's seizure 
never de-escalated to a consensual encounter. First, because of the hour, that is, a little 
after midnight, it was dark and Mogen had limited access to visual and non-visual cues as 
to Slaugh's intentions and the meaning of his behavior. The stop occurred on an isolated 
stretch of highway. Apparently the only illumination of the scene came from the flashing 
overhead emergency lights on Slaugh's patrol car, parked some distance away. Had the 
encounter between Slaugh and Mogen occurred in daylight, or a well-lit place at night, 
Mogen would have had more opportunity to comprehend the significance of events and 
form a clearer picture of whether he was free to leave at a given point in time. 
Second, after Slaugh returned Mogen's driver's license, Mogen was not in a 
position to leave the scene immediately even if he had wanted to. Mogen had taken out 
decision to contest the trial court's suppression order, it had an affirmative duty to ensure 
that the court's written findings were sufficiently detailed to allow for review. "Parties 
claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to 
support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 
(Utah 1993); Utah R. App. P. 1 l(e)(l)-(2). 
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log books and was working on them when Slaugh ran the driver's license and warrant 
checks. Presumably, he needed some time to complete what he was doing or at the very 
least to put the books back where he had found them. Presumably, too, he needed time 
to put his driver's license back where he normally kept it. 
Third, after giving Mogen his license back, Slaugh himself did not immediately 
leave. He did not turn and walk away from the driver's side window. Rather, Slaugh 
stayed where he was and stared at Mogen for a few seconds. Mogen felt that he had 
something more to say to him. 
Fourth, when Slaugh did move, he took only a couple of steps before returning to 
where he had been standing. Mere seconds passed. Mogen interpreted Slaugh's body 
language, in particular his facial expressions, to mean that Slaugh wanted to continue 
talking with him. 
Fifth, Slaugh asked Mogen an intrusive and suspicious question.6 He did not say, 
"Mind if I have a peek inside the cab?" Instead, he said, u[M]ind if I took a look for any 
illegal drugs, guns, knives or bombs?" Such a request, phrased in the manner that it is, 
would be very difficult for ordinary citizens to routinely refuse. In fact, many citizens, 
especially those driving vehicles that they do not own, would wonder if perhaps police 
had knowledge about some illegal activity or hidden danger that should be detected as 
soon as possible. 
6See Hansen, 2000 UT 353 at % 24. 
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Sixth, Slaugh asked his question immediately after Mogen had been detained for 
five to ten minutes, without intervening circumstances of any kind.7 
Seventh, Slaugh's question was subtly coercive. Slaugh had only issued Mogen a 
verbal warning about speeding. He could have written a ticket, and he still could write 
one at the time that the question was asked.8 
Eighth, nothing in the record indicates that Slaugh informed Morgen that he might 
refuse his request to search the truck.9 
Ninth, at the time that Slaugh wanted to search, he retained all the accouterments 
of authority that he made use of stopping Slaugh in the first place. In particular, the 
overhead emergency lights on Slaugh's patrol vehicle were still flashing. 
Tenth, Slaugh made Mogen get out of the truck and stand in front of it until he 
completed his search.10 
7See id 
9Cf Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 901 (Pa. 2000) (defendant 
already out of vehicle when consent to search given). 
On this subject, Mogen does not seek a bright-line rule, which determines per se 
the point in time when police detention of a citizen is transformed into a consensual 
encounter. The issue is one that properly is decided on the basis of the totality of 
circumstances. Nonetheless, Mogen hopes that if this Court reviews and analyzes his 
case, it will offer up instruction to police and citizens alike regarding the sometimes gray 
area marking the boundary between detentions and consensual encounters. 
1C]Compare Strickler (defendant already out of vehicle when consent to search 
given) with Ferris v. Maryland, 735 A.2d 491, 502 (Md. 1999) (after issuance of 
speeding ticket defendant removed from vehicle for purposes of questioning and search). 
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And eleventh, Mogen believed that he was not free to leave and needed to stay 
where he was, immediately following return of his driver's license, because of officer 
safety. Mogen did not want to hit Slaugh with the flared side of the truck or the load 
that he was carrying. Had Mogen attempted to leave as soon as Slaugh gave him his 
license back, as the State suggests that he might have, there apparently could have been 
an accident with serious injury or even loss of life. 
These are the unique facts and circumstances of the case. None is controlling. 
Taken together, however, they necessarily lead to the conclusion that it never was clear 
to Mogen, as a seized person, that once he received his verbal warning and got his 
driver's license back he was free to decline Slaugh's request to search the truck, then 
immediately terminate the encounter with Slaugh and go about his business as before. 
The State points to only two facts supporting its position that the contact between 
Slaugh and Mogen was consensual in nature when Slaugh asked for permission to search. 
They are that Slaugh returned Mogen's license and-supposedly-Slaugh told Mogen that 
he was free to leave. In emphasizing these factors, the State ignores the totality of the 
circumstances. Further, as the State itself points out in its brief, return of a driver's 
documentation does not necessarily render any subsequent interchange consensual "if 
the driver has objectively reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave." 
United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. 
Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 959 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 881 (1991)); accord 
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United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997) (and cases cited therein). 
Also, it ultimately is immaterial whether or not Slaugh told Mogen that he could leave. 
The United States Supreme Court has rejected a bright-line rule, requiring police to 
inform detainees that they are free to leave, before an encounter is deemed to be 
consensual. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 33-34 (1996). The issue is always fact-
intensive, to be decided on the basis of a totality of circumstances test. Id. 
The State attempts to draw a parallel between Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 
P.2d 884 (Pa. 2000), and this case. In Strickler, a police officer stopped and issued 
defendant a verbal warning, started to return to his patrol car, changed his mind, walked 
back, and asked defendant for permission to search his vehicle. The officer found a 
marijuana pipe. The trial court suppressed the evidence. The supreme court reversed. 
The facts in Strickler, however, are actually quite different than here. Defendant was out 
of his vehicle, urinating on the side of the road, when police approached him and 
checked the validity of his driver's license and whether he had outstanding warrants. No 
traffic stop occurred. The police officer did not ask defendant to exit his vehicle or direct 
his physical movements in any way. In addition, after the officer issued his warning, he 
expressly informed defendant of his right to refuse the request to search his vehicle. In 
such circumstances, which do not exist in this particular case, the supreme court 
concluded that defendant's valid, initial detention de-escalated to a consensual 
encounter where no Fourth Amendment rights were implicated. 
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Another case that the State cites, People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (111. 1999), 
actually supports Mogen's position. The distinction that the State wishes to make, 
namely that police stared at defendant's co-passengers "several minutes" while Slaugh 
stared at Mogen just a few seconds, is immaterial to the determination of this case 
because it is only one circumstance, out of the totality of circumstances, that must be 
identified and evaluated. Further, the focus in Brownlee moves beyond the question of 
the precise length of defendant's continued detention. The case stands squarely for the 
proposition, rooted in federal constitutional law, that following the conclusion of a legal 
traffic stop police may not detain a vehicle without reasonable suspicion of any illegal 
activity and for any length of time, despite their requesting and receiving permission to 
search the vehicle. Id. at 563. 
This is the law in Utah. As the Utah Supreme Court has declared, "Once a traffic 
stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) 
(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)). Any additional delay is permissible 
only on the basis of reasonable suspicion. "Investigative questioning that further detains 
the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the 
totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." Id.; see also State 
v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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In this case, after Slaugh issued his verbal warning to Mogen, returned Mogen's 
driver's license to him, and started back to his patrol car, he had no reasonable suspicion 
to turn around and ask Mogen for permission to search the truck. No evidence of illegal 
activity was in plain view. There was no odor of drugs. Mogen did not seem impaired. 
Slaugh had not received a tip. In his own words, Slaugh had "no particular reason" for 
his request to search. Assuming, then, that Mogen was still seized, because it was not 
clear to him that he was free to leave, Mogen's consent to search was given when he was 
illegally detained and the protections of the Fourth Amendment most definitely apply. 
The trial court concluded, correctly, that the methamphetamine and torch must be 
suppressed. Mogen consented to search, but that consent was not valid. It was obtained 
while Mogen was still within the arena of the detention of the traffic stop. Slaugh 
needed an independent, constitutionally permitted basis for requesting and then carrying 
out his search. The court's conclusion as to this matter is grounded in the Fourth 
Amendment. Where an illegal detention has occurred, a subsequent consent to search 
may be found to have been tainted by the illegality. Royer, 460 U.S. at 501 (citing Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). A consent obtained during an illegal 
detention is ineffective to justify an otherwise invalid search. Id.; see also Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1991). 
The evidence found in the truck that Mogen was driving is the poisonous fruit of 
Mogen's illegal detention and the search that took place. As such, the trial court 
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properly suppressed it. On appeal, the State might have argued that the evidence should 
not have been suppressed, despite the fact that Mogen's detention was illegal. But the 
State has not done so. See fn.3? supra. The State has chosen to insist that Mogen9s 
consent to search was valid because, at the time of consent, his encounter with Slaugh 
was consensual, not that the consent was valid because it satisfied the tests set forth in 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990), and its progeny including State v. Ham, 
910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The State therefore has waived the right to 
contest the trial court's determination that evidence in the truck must be suppressed 
because such evidence is tainted. The waiver is fatal as regards the State's appeal. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that "when a consensual search is preceded by a Fourth 
Amendment violation, the evidence obtained from the search must be excluded unless 
the state proves that the consent was voluntary and that it was not obtained by exploiting 
the violation." State v. Shoulder blade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995) (citing Arroyo, 
796 P.2d at 688). The State has not proven, or even attempted to prove, that Mogen's 
consent was voluntary and not obtained by exploitation of prior illegality, within the 
legal meaning of those phrases. 
From start to finish this is a detention case. The issue is whether Slaugh's 
detention of Mogen ever de-escalated to a consensual encounter. The State argues that 
there was such an encounter, beginning when Slaugh returned Mogen's license and 
allegedly told Mogen he was free to go and continuing during the time Slaugh sought and 
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received permission to search the truck. The State has gone to great lengths in advancing 
its argument, citing United States Supreme Court cases along with cases from federal and 
state jurisdictions throughout the country. An irony, of course, is that legal argument of 
the type presented is well beyond the ken of ordinary citizens, who in fact have little or 
no idea of their rights when stopped by police on the highway. They are not attorneys, 
much less constitutional scholars. They are, then, very much at risk in encounters with 
police. As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in Robinette, before the case ultimately was 
decided by the United States Supreme Court, "The transition between detention and a 
consensual exchange can be so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has 
occurred. The undetectability of that transition may be used by police officers to coerce 
citizens into answering questions that they need not answer, or to allow a search of a 
vehicle that they are not legally obligated to allow." State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 
698 (Ohio 1995). 
No one knows what was going on in Deputy Slaugh's mind. But consciously or 
unconsciously, deliberately or accidentally, Slaugh attempted a seamless, undetectable 
transition from detention to consensual encounter when interacting with Mogen. Mogen 
was alone at the time. He had no one to offer legal advice and guidance. Now, however, 
Mogen has this Court. He believes that this Court should affirm the trial court's 
suppression order, based on something that he probably did not know about or at least 
had not thought about much, that is, the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
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Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. It protects citizens, not the police. And it should protect Mogen in this case. 
There was no transition from detention to consensual encounter. Slaugh needed but did 
not have reasonable suspicion to search the truck that Mogen was driving. Mogen's 
consent was the product of unlawful detention and not valid. Evidence found in the 
truck must be suppressed. 
Conclusion 
The Court of Appeals should dismiss the State's appeal. Alternatively, the Court 
should affirm the trial court's suppression order and subsequent dismissal of the case. 
DATED this ^ day of December, 2001. 
WESLEY M.BADEN 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-403 
COLI,A:TK \\ uryyuv\ <-s 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments Participation in larceny or theft as preclud-
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal ing conviction for receiving or concealing the 
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 1,37. stolen property, 29 A.L.R.5th 59. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi- Seizure or detention for purpose of commit-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L. ting rape, robbery, or other offense as constitut-
Rev. 177. ing separate crime of kidnapping, 39 A.L.R.5th 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 283. 
§ 20. Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge to 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 14. jury in federal prosecution for crime involving 
A.L.R. — Lesser-related state offense in- property rights, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 669. 
structions: modern status, 50 A.L.R.4th 1081. Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in 
Various acts of weapons violations as sepa- federal prosecution of narcotics defendant, 106 
rate or continuing offense, 80 A.L.R.4th 631 VL.R Fed. 236. 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barr ing subsequent pros-
ecution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a 
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have 
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant 
tha t has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty 
by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence 
to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an 
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt 
tha t has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termiilation takes 
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes 
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the 
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of 
prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is 
necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity 
with the law; or 
19 
7 6 - 1 - 4 0 3 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the 
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict revers-
ible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable 
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, § 3. 
ANALYSIS 
Acquittal. 
Conduct constituting single crime. 
Consent to termination. 
Evaluation. 
Mistrial. 
Severed counts. 
Cited. 
Acquittal. 
Trial court's ruling at the end of the state's 
case that "the state failed to present sufficient 
evidence to make out a prima facie case on. any 
of the remaining counts of the information" and 
dismissal with prejudice was an acquittal and 
not a dismissal. State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d 267 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Conduct const i tut ing s ingle crime. 
Retention of stolen property of different indi-
viduals is a single act and a single offense when 
evidence shows that the items were retained 
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items 
were the subject of a previous prosecution for 
related offenses, a second prosecution was pre-
cluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant's concurrent possession of mari-
juana paraphernalia and methamphetamine 
satisfied the temporal requirement of the single 
criminal episode statute but, because separate 
statutory offenses were involved, the posses-
sion did not satisfy the "same criminal objec-
tive" requirement. State v. Keppler, 976 R2d 99 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Consent to termination. 
Lack of objection to state's motion to dismiss 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§ 347 et seq. 
C.J .S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 208. 
A.L.R. — Prosecution for robbery of one 
person as bar to subsequent prosecution for 
robbery of another person committed at the 
was not the equivalent of consenting to termi-
nation of trial, which would have allowed the 
state to retry defendant on the same charges. 
State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Evaluation. 
Both the sequence of events leading to a trial 
termination, and the equivocation or ambiguity 
of a defendant's response, are important factors 
to consider in determining whether reprosecu-
tion is permissible. State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 
1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Mistrial. 
Trial court's order of a mistrial was proper 
based on its determination, borne out by the 
record, that defendant acted contrary to the 
court's instructions throughout the proceed-
ings. State v. Castle. 951 P.2d 1109 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). 
Severed counts . 
This section does not mandate dismissal if 
counts were properly severed. Thus, where a 
magistrate severed counts "to promote justice" 
and the district court later refused to rejoin 
them for the same reason after defendant had 
been convicted on one of the counts, the case 
was not one that "should have been tried under 
§ 76-1-402." State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah 
1987). 
Cited in State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 
1987); State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah 
1991). 
same time, 51 A.L.R.3d 693. 
Determination that state failed to prove 
charges relied upon for revocation of probation 
as barring subsequent criminal action based on 
same underlying charges, 2 A.L.R.5th 262. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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• History: C. 1953, 77-18-15, e n a c t e d by L. fee for processing an expungement order under 
|lfc/*, ch. 143, § 7; 1995, ch . 286, § 2; 1999, Section 63-38-3," made a stylistic change, and 
fth :27, § 6. redesignated subsections accordingly For fee 
/ tnendment No tes . — The 1995 amend- provisions, see § 77-18-11(2). 
.< . i, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection Cross-References . — Board of Pardons and 
| ( i ; and redesignated the following subsections Parole, § 77-27-2. 
| £;•; idingly. Division of Occupational and Professional 
I V a 1999 amendment, effective July 1, 1999, Licensing, § 58-1-103. 
<J Ujd former Subsection (2), which read "The Peace Officer Standards and Training Divi-
*•••i.-.ion may charge a petitioner a reasonable sion, § 53-6-103. 
18-16. Penalty. 
Any person who willfully violates any prohibition in this chapter is guilty of 
i
 A,iss A misdemeanor. 
history: C. 1953, 77-18-16, e n a c t e d b y I , 
1, ch. 143, § 8. 
;V / 18- 1 ' 3 Retroacti % e applicatioi I. 
The provisions of Sections 77-18-9 through 77-18-17 apply retroactively to 
ail arrests and convictions regardless of the date on which the arrests were 
i jde or convictions were entered. 
ilistory: C. 1953, 77-18-17. ena< it-ri l.v \ 
' i 'U , ch. 143, § 9, 
CHAPTER 18a 
THE APPEAL 
r.etion 
W-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
W-18a-2. Capital cases. 
/7-18a-l. Appeals — When proper, 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony 
information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
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(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence 
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal 
would be in the interest of justice; 
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a final order under subsec-
tion (2)(a), a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as 
charged or a pretrial order dismissing or quashing in part a felony 
information, when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides 
that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l, enacted by L. The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
1990, ch. 7, § 10; 1995, ch. 65, § 1; 1997, ch. 
364, $ 1. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added the phrase 
beginning "including a dismissal" to Subsection 
(2Xa). 
added Subsection (2)(f) and made related sty-
listic changes. 
Compiler's Notes . — This chapter 
recodifies Subsections (2), (3), and (9) of former 
Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appealability. 
Appeal by defendant. 
Appeal by prosecution. 
Arrest of judgment. 
Bind over orders. 
Death penalty cases. 
"Dismissal." 
Double jeopardy. 
Habeas corpus ruling. 
Oral s tatements from bench. 
Suppression orders. 
Cited. 
Appealabil ity. 
To determine whether an appeal falls within 
one of the enumerated grounds, the appellate 
court looks to the substance of the ruling and 
not to the label attached by a trial judge. State 
v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App.), 
affd, 852 R2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
Appeal by defendant . 
A purported second judgment and sentence, 
which was clearly an at tempt to render a judg-
ment in criminal proceeding which if valid 
would have affected defendant's rights, was 
appealable. State v. Alexander, 15 Utah 2d 14, 
386P .2d411 (1963). 
Denial of motion to dismiss on double jeop-
ardy grounds is a "final" judgment; rights pro-
tected by the double jeopardy guarantee neces-
sitate review on appeal before a second trial if 
defendant is to enjoy full protection of the 
clause. State v. Ambrose, 598 R2d 354 (Utah 
1979). 
Appeal by prosecut ion. 
District court's judgment, discharging defen-
dant in criminal prosecution and releasing his 
bail, entered on plea to court's jurisdiction, was 
final judgment from which state might appeal. 
State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899). 
State had right of appeal from judgment, 
discharging defendant, in prosecution for 
felony, on ground that information did not state 
facts sufficient to constitute public offense. 
State v. McKenna, 24 Utah 317. 67 P. 815 
(1902). 
The state had no right to appeal sentence 
imposed upon defendant since the imposition of 
sentence was part of the judgment, and not an 
order made after judgment. State v. Kelbach, 
569 R2d 1100 (Utah 1977). 
Former section did not authorize the prosecu-
tion to appeal an acquittal, no matter how 
overwhelming the evidence against the defen-: 
dant mav be. State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1983). 
Where dismissal of charge was based on trial 
court's construction of the applicable law before 
the court ruled on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to convict, the ruling was. in effect, a 
"final judgment of dismissal" and therefore was • 
appealable even though the ruling was made at; 
the close of all the evidence. State v.-
Musselman, 667 R2d 1061 (Utah 1983). "2 
The state may not, following a pretrial ruling 
suppressing some state's evidence, request dia-j 
missal of a criminal case in order to avoid the* 
discretionary appeal provisions and to obtain, 
an appeal of right. State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2<L 
223 (Utah 1985). | 
A trial court's dismissal of a case on the] 
ground that the prosecution has not proved anl 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable! 
doubt is in substance an acquittal and therefore 
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